The Ryle in Ryland v Fletcher

Liability is strict where the defendant is liable for damage caused by his act irrespective of any fault on his part.

In Ryland v. Fletcher, where the defendants employed independent contractors to build a reservoir on their land who carelessly omitted to block up to on escape of water after the reservoir had been filled thereby flooding the plaintiff‟ s mine. The court held them strictly liable for the damage. The rule was propounded by Blackburn J. who stated that, „The person who, for his own purpose and in the course of non natural user of his land, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril and if he does not do so, is answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. Some facts may give rise to liability in both nuisance and the rule in Ryland v. Fletcher.

Differences between the rule in Rylands v Fletcher and Nuisance

1. The rule i Rylands v Fletcher is the accumulation of physical object that escape and do damage, while nuisance involves interference caused by intangibles.
2. In the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, there must be an accumulation. This accumulation is not required for Nuisance.
3. The rule in Rylands v Fletcher involves an escape to a place outside defendant's land, while an escape is not necessary for nuisance.
4. A plaintiff who is not an occupies of adjoining land may sue for the tort in RYlands v FLetcher, but such a person may not sue for nuisance.
5. Liability is confined to non-natural uses of land in the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, while there is no such rule in the tort of nuisance.

Scope/elements of the rule

1. Things within the rule: Accordingly Blackburn J, it includes anything likely to do mischief if it escape which involve inherently dangerous materials e.g. explosives and relatively innocuous things which only become hazardous when accumulated in large quantity e.g. water sewage, etc.
2. Bringing on the land and accumulation: The defendant must have artificially brought the thing on his land and accumulated it there for the rule to apply. The defendant will not be liable for damage caused by the escape of things e.g. water/rocks since they are naturally on the land e.g. vegetation, weeds, etc. He will be liable for escape of anything he plants Ryland v. Fletcher.
3. Escape: There must be an escape of the accumulated substance from the land where it is kept to a place outside. According to Lord Simon, Escape means escape from a place where the defendant has occupation or control over land to a place which is outside his occupation or control. See the case of Hale v. Jenning Bros.

   In Read v. Lyons, it was held that there was no escape and therefore no liability where the plaintiff was injured by an explosion which occurred within the factory as she was carrying out her duties inside it.

   In Ponting v. Noakes, a poisonous tree on the defendant’s land caused the death of a horse which at its leaves by reaching over from adjacent land, the tree never having extended beyond the defendants boundary. It was held that there was no escape. In Hale v. Jenning Bros, it was held that there was sufficient escape where a piece of equipment was thrown from one part of the fairground to another since each part was occupied by different persons.

4. Non-natural User: The word natural may mean that which exist in/by nature or that which is ordinary and usual, though artificial. According to Lord Moulton in Rickard v. Lothian, it must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to other and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land Non-natural user is a question of fact and all the circumstances of time and practice of mankind must be taken into consideration. One advantage of this flexible concept is that it can be adjusted to meet changing social needs e.g. normal industrial activity. In Rickards v. Lothian, water pipe installations in buildings was held to be a natural user. In Hale v. Jennings Bros, it was held that the operation of a “chair-o-plane” in a fairground was a non-natural user.

   In Umudje v. Shell B.P. Petroleum Dev. Cool Nig. Ltd, where the plaintiffs who owned land adjacent to the area of oil exploration complained that the defendant blocked and diverted a natural stream as well as accumulated oil waste on land under their control which escaped and caused damage to the plaintiff’s land. The SC held that the defendants were not liable because their blacking of the stream had merely caused starvation of water and fish there was no escape of water however the defendant were held liable under the rule for the escape of crude oil waste accumulated under their control which had polluted certain ponds on the plaintiff’s land.

5. Damage: Damage must be proved. The harm protected by this tort is damage to land, building, fixtures and chattel. A person having interest in land may recover for personal injuries. The modern trend is towards allowing for purely economic loss.

Defences

1. Consent of the Plaintiff: Where a plaintiff has expressly/impliedly consented to the present the source of danger. The defendant is not liable unless he has been negligent Volenti non fit injuria. In Ruddinan v. Smith, it was held that a plaintiff will not be deemed to have consented to a flood caused by carelessness in forgetting to turn off a tap.
2. Default of the Plaintiff: There is no liability if the escape was due to the default of the plaintiff. In Dunn v. Birmingham Canal co where the plaintiff worked a mine under the defendant’s canal which later resulted in the flooding and inundation of the mine. The defendant was not liable. The defendant will not be liable for the abnormal sensitivity of the plaintiff’s property.
3. Act of God: In Nichols v. Marshland, where an extra ordinary rainfall, “greater and more violent than any within the memory of the witness broke down the embankments and the rush of the escaping water swept away certain bridges of the plaintiff. The defendant was not held liable for an extraordinary act of nature which she could not have reasonably anticipated. It must be shown that human foresight and prudence could not have recognized the possibility of the event.
4. Act of the Stranger: It is a defence if the escape complained of was caused by the deliberate act of a stranger which the defendant could not reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant. In Perry v. Kendreks Transport Ltd., the owner of a vehicle was not liable for damage caused by the act of mischievous children in throwing a lighted match into the petrol tank.
5. Statutory Authority: Public authorities charged with providing a particular public service are exempted from liability provided that they have not been negligent. It is a question of construction of the statute as to the extent liability under Rylands v. Fletcher had been excluded.